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Environmental citizenship and public attitudes to hydrogen energy
technologies
Rob Flynn*, Paul Bellaby and Miriam Ricci
Institute for Social, Cultural and Policy Research, University of Salford, Salford, UK
Some of the principal arguments in the debate about environmental
citizenship are examined with reference to the development of hydrogen
energy systems. In particular, qualitative evidence is drawn from a study of
public attitudes towards hydrogen energy technologies and their perceived
risks and beneﬁts. Using data from focus groups in three areas of the UK, it
is argued that while there is awareness of the importance of energy issues,
opinions about innovation using hydrogen are generally neutral, and there
is little indication of the collective and solidaristic values said to
characterise environmental citizenship.
Introduction
In contemporary advanced industrial societies, political concern about the
impact of global warming and climate change has begun to intensify. Despite
some evidence that the general public is aware of environmental problems and
a crisis over fossil fuels, evidence that this is resulting in major changes in
behaviour (for example, in energy use) is not compelling. Some commentators
have optimistically suggested that the conditions of modern citizenship can be
extended to incorporate ecological rights and responsibilities, in the form of
environmental citizenship. Here we ﬁrst brieﬂy review concepts of ‘environ-
mental citizenship’ and the linkages between citizenship, environmental risks
and sustainability. We then examine qualitative evidence about public
perceptions of the energy crisis, hydrogen technologies and sustainability.
Hydrogen has been identiﬁed as potentially providing a radically new and
environment-friendly energy system. Findings from focus groups are presented
about: awareness of global warming, environmental problems and energy;
responsibility for behaviour change; and attitudes towards hydrogen. It is
argued that while the level of public awareness of environmental
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(and speciﬁcally energy) issues is generally high, there is little sign of a
substantive commitment to the solidaristic values ascribed to environmental
citizenship. In relation to hydrogen energy, environmental citizenship is only
latent and provisional, and certainly falls short of ‘ecological citizenship’.
Citizenships
To understand the meaning of environmental or ecological citizenship ﬁrst we
must brieﬂy consider some of the wider debate about the construction of
modern citizenship. Bryan Turner’s (1990, 2001) cogent critique of T.H.
Marshall’s concept of citizenship provided a synthesis of its changing scope
and continuing relevance. Turner (1990) identiﬁed citizenship as a central issue
for social integration and social solidarity, and emphasised the role of social
struggles and conﬂict in its creation and maintenance. He noted that national
boundaries around citizenship have become less important as a result of
globalisation. Turner (2001) further developed his critique of Marshall’s
concept, in which social rights were the core. Like other commentators, Turner
examined the signiﬁcance of duties and obligations, and their connection with
‘an inclusionary process involving some re-allocation of resources and an
exclusionary process of building identities on the basis of a common or
imagined solidarity’ (Turner 2001, p. 192). In particular, he argued that a new
regime of rights had emerged with changed economic and global environ-
mental conditions. New forms of citizenship had developed, ‘driven by a
common problem of modern society, namely the relationship between the
human body and the environment’ (p. 204). Social risks created by new
technology, environmental pollution, and the spread of AIDS, were examples
Turner cited in which new forms of citizenship had begun to emerge. Thus,
rights to a safe environment were not seen as merely part of the agenda for
environmental social movements, but part of much wider demands ‘to protect
humans from the negative consequences of economic growth and technology
on their health and safety’ (p. 206).
In this, Turner was extending the important argument that Marshallian
citizenship required adaptation to current contexts, particularly in relation to
environmental issues and the wider debate about ‘risk society’ highlighted by
Beck (1992). Newby (1996) also strongly urged that Marshall’s concept of
citizenship should be modiﬁed to deal with needs, rights, duties and obligations
arising in relation to the environment and sustainability. For Newby,
‘environmental citizenship’ linked socio-economic with scientiﬁc-technological
issues, especially global threats such as the depletion of natural resources and
degradation of the environment. Newby (1996, p. 218) proposed that ‘we are
all, therefore, environmental citizens now’, and this raised classic problems of
cooperation, interdependency and social order. Somewhat earlier, van
Steenbergen (1994) had noted that Marshall’s concept of citizenship was
fundamentally about levels of material well-being, and argued that contem-
porary citizenship had a fourth dimension (to be added to civil, political and
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social rights) comprising environmental or ecological citizenship. This, he
argued, was underwritten by responsibilities for the natural world and
restraints on action. Dahrendorf (1994, p. 18) too had also acknowledged
that while it was diﬃcult to ‘stipulate an entitlement for all of us as world
citizens to a liveable planet, and thus to actions which sustain it, . . . something
of this kind may well belong on the agenda of citizenship’.
Environmental citizenship
Various writers have observed that social scientists have paid insuﬃcient
attention to the growing importance of ecological risks and environmental
issues. From diﬀerent standpoints, Dickens (1992), Newby (1991) and Beck
(1995) criticised sociology for its neglect of the natural and physical
environment, and each urged it to overcome the conventional ‘nature/society’
dichotomy. Barry (1999) advocated a ‘relational’ approach to the environment
and nature, and argued that the ‘greening’ of social theory entails greater
awareness of the ecological embeddedness and biological embodiedness of
humans. He also noted that sustainability was a corollary of such an approach:
concern for nature and environment inevitably involved a future orientation
and sense of obligation to future generations.
Irwin (2001) argued for a critical distance on ‘sustainability discourse’.
Thus:
the linkages between a sense of environmental crisis, calls for inter-generational
equity and the notion of togetherness are not simply given but instead are actively
constructed . . . the environmental crisis does not simply impact upon our lives
but is mediated and reconstructed within a host of social institutions and
through . . . kinds of discourse formation . . . (Irwin 2001, p. 47)
Irwin went on to advocate much closer attention to the experiences, ‘framings’
and locally mediated understandings of environmental issues and
sustainability.
Similarly, Yearley (2005) has argued that ideas about sustainable living
have been limited because they neglect sociological analysis of what constitutes
a ‘sustainable’ life. Yearley acknowledged that as sustainable development is
deﬁned as meeting present needs without jeopardising the capacity of future
generations to meet their own needs, there has tended to be a preoccupation
with ‘technical’ (environmental) questions and economic arrangements, but
very little attention paid to cultural practices and social institutions. The
crucial questions about environmentalism and sustainability, Yearley claims,
are ones about social order, and distributional and equity issues, and people’s
understandings and actions around such issues. Using the example of energy
resources, Yearley notes that much research has focused on energy conserva-
tion and new sources of energy, and some aspects of consumer behaviour, but
questions of how people regard the ownership, trading and use of energy as a
commodity and as a social resource are rarely debated. Thus ‘the social
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institutions of sustainable societies are missing – or are implicit and
unexamined’ (Yearley 2005, p. 180).
The concepts of environmental and ecological citizenship have gained
widespread currency in political theory but to a much lesser extent within the
disciplines of social policy and sociology. In practice, they have been embraced
politically by numerous environmental social movements and lobby groups.
The rapid and extensive growth of the ‘Green’ movement and green political
theory (see, for example, Dickens 1992, Barry 1999, Dean 2001, Yearley 2005)
has forced social scientists to re-think their conceptual frameworks and to
address much more systematically issues beyond the conventional or
traditional approaches to questions of life chances primarily determined by
the labour market and welfare institutions.
Dobson has extensively debated the signiﬁcance of these issues in much
recent writing. Dobson (2003) noted that current environmental problems are
not conﬁned to nation-state boundaries, and that globalisation itself produces
new kinds of ecological asymmetries both within and between states. Dobson
(2003) also distinguished a model of ‘environmental’ citizenship which stresses
entitlements and rights, from ‘ecological’ citizenship which stresses duties and
responsibilities, based on obligations. Both, he claims are valid, and are
complementary, oriented towards the achievement of a sustainable society.
Ecological citizenship seeks a just distribution of (ecological) resources.
Dobson and Valencia Saiz (2005) take these arguments further. They propose
that ecological citizenship must be based on the recognition that sustainability
implies commitment to the idea of ‘the common good’ (versus self-interest) and
that in practice this requires a major shift in attitudes and behaviour. Bell
(2005) identiﬁes environmental citizenship as deriving from the ‘liberal’ model
of citizenship, comprising basic environmental rights and duties. These rights
minimally include environmental goods such as clean air and water, but also
extend to procedural rights to be included in decision-making about the
environment. Duties include the obligation to comply with environmental laws
but also to justify choices about lifestyles which aﬀect the environment.
Dobson and Bell (2006) analyse environmental citizenship theory, and
diﬀerentiate the ‘liberal’ approach to rights, as compared with the ‘republican’
approach focused on responsibilities. Each problematises ‘virtues’ such as
willingness to work for the common good and the connection between
individual actions and their collective impact. Barry (2006) advocates the
‘republican’ approach and applies it to what he terms sustainability citizenship.
This goes beyond environmental citizenship because it is not restricted solely to
environmental issues – instead it raises questions about the structural causes of
environmental degradation and implies a commitment to a diﬀerent type of
(sustainable) society. There has been some disagreement about whether
Dobson’s concept of ecological citizenship is distinctive (since it does not
entail membership of a polity), and whether his advocacy of a normative
concept of ecological citizenship is convincing (see Dobson 2006, Hayward
2006a, 2006b). However, there is an emerging consensus that the concepts of
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environmental and ecological citizenship highlight important questions about
solidaristic values and behaviour associated with sustainability. Most
importantly, as Dobson and Valencia Saiz (2005, p. 128) note, the citizenship
approach to sustainability draws on the core idea of the ‘common good’.
To summarise, this brief review has indicated a number of signiﬁcant inter-
related issues. First, people’s life chances are aﬀected by environmental
processes and may be inﬂuenced by the possible emergence of ‘environmental’
or ‘ecological’ citizenship. People’s structured opportunities are partly
conditioned by the availability and distribution of scarce natural resources
(for example, fossil fuels and the supply of energy) and the overall constraints
of global environmental change. They are also directly and indirectly aﬀected
by private action and state intervention, reﬂected in consumer attitudes,
producer behaviour, and regulatory regimes in particular spheres (for example,
pollution, energy use, recycling, etc.). Second, insofar as ‘green’ environmental
awareness has developed, notions of environmental/ecological citizenship
presume changes in social attitudes and political belief – and behaviour –
oriented towards duties and obligations connected with the ‘common good’.
For example, if access to and use of energy resources is a major concern for
people, how far are they prepared to alter their behaviour to safeguard those
resources, or accept redistribution among competing citizens, or tolerate
rationing by price and/or state controls? How far are they willing to support
the development of new energy technologies which are being introduced to
cope with climate change or global warming but which may involve potentially
new risks and beneﬁts which themselves may be unequally distributed? In
energy policy and related environmental issues, does individual self-interest
coexist with expressed concern for collective welfare, and how might this aﬀect
environmental citizenship and sustainability?
Many studies have previously identiﬁed contradictions between ‘egoism’
and ‘altruism’ in environmental policy, and the tensions between the citizen
and consumer role. The dissonance between people’s beliefs about problems in
the environment and their preparedness to change behaviour (for example, to
reduce energy use) is well established (Dobson and Bell 2006, Nash and Lewis
2006). Berglund and Matti (2006), for example, provide evidence (from
Sweden, about the recycling of waste) that the civic virtue associated with ‘the
common good’ is tempered by rational economic incentives. They argue that in
practice, people have ‘multiple preference orderings’ which are applied
diﬀerentially in diﬀerent contexts. Data from the large-scale British Social
Attitudes Survey have demonstrated a disconnection between environmental
awareness and action. The incidence of environmentally-friendly behaviour
was found to be far lower than people’s level of environmental concern. This
was explained, partly, by people’s sense that they had little capacity to act even
if they felt a kind of responsibility, as well as a broader distrust of industry and
government, and an anxiety that not everyone would ‘do their bit’. In general,
attitudes to the environment were characterised by contradictoriness, confu-
sion and inconsistency (Christie and Jarvis 2002).
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The problems of breaking out of an economy totally dominated by fossil
fuels, and diﬃculties in bringing about major changes in people’s lifestyles
towards sustainability, have been noted by many other commentators (see
Murphy and Cohen 2001). One important recent report on moves towards
sustainable consumption and social justice described the current inertia,
expressed in a prevailing public attitude of ‘I will if you will’ (Sustainable
Development Commission 2006). However, at the ‘micro’ level, the apparent
gap between attitude and action cannot be explained solely in terms of lack of
information. Hobson (2001, 2003) showed in a detailed qualitative study of
household consumption and lifestyles, that the limits on people’s willingness to
change is partly linked with speciﬁc discourses or rhetorics about consumption
and the environment, and partly to do with the deeply-embedded nature of
everyday practices.
This was also highlighted much earlier by Macnaghten and Urry (1998).
Using focus groups about people’s knowledge of ‘nature’ and the environment,
Macnaghten and Urry found that people’s beliefs and attitudes were
ambivalent and contradictory. ‘Environmentalism’ had diverse and multiple
meanings, and such meanings were highly contingent on people’s local
experiences and cultural practices. Sustainability issues entailed ontological
questions which were seen as very challenging for people’s sense of identity and
group membership. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, they showed that when
presented with diﬀerent scenarios and standpoints, people adopted contra-
dictory positions, depending on how the issue was ‘framed’. Thus, in
connection with certain environmental controversies, the same issues were
understood in diﬀerent ways when those issues were presented in diﬀerent
ways. Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 229) further concluded that groups ‘did
not sense that personal individual actions were likely to make a diﬀerence’, and
that ‘collective action was unrealistic, given people’s sense of the prevalence of
‘‘short-termism’’ within the state and business’. Although there was evidence of
environmental concern, there was little indication of adjustments in lifestyle:
‘most people were not radically restructuring their lives or actively engaged in
environmental protest’ (1998, p. 231).
Given this background, how might people now regard a potential
transformation in the energy system which appears to oﬀer environmental
beneﬁts but which also requires substantial changes in lifestyles and
infrastructures? The next section of the paper examines public perceptions of
hydrogen energy technology and some of the implications of a move to a
hydrogen economy, to explore how far evidence of attitudes supporting
environmental citizenship can be discerned.
Attitudes and beliefs about energy and hydrogen technologies
In the context of rapid depletion of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, oil) and
concern about climate change and global warming, governments in the major
industrial capitalist countries have been investigating the potential
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contribution of alternative or renewable energy sources, and also the feasibility
of using hydrogen as an energy carrier. Hydrogen is the most abundant
element in the universe; it can be produced by splitting water into hydrogen
and oxygen, and can be derived from electricity (from any source, including
nuclear energy) or from reforming gas (from natural gas, and methane from
biomass). Hydrogen has been frequently described as ‘clean’ and ‘green’ and
non-polluting. It can be used in fuel-cell vehicles (where the only immediate
waste is water vapour), in localised combined heat-and-power systems for
buildings, in mobile applications (such as laptops) and in a variety of other
applications. Rifkin (2002) claimed that the widespread introduction of
hydrogen energy technologies could revolutionise the economy and social
structure, as it might enable the decentralised local generation of electricity – it
might ‘democratise’ energy production.
Hydrogen is not a fuel as such, but an energy carrier. The principal
concerns among technical experts and energy economists are its infrastructure
investment costs and relative eﬃciency, possible hazards and safety regulation
(see Flynn et al. 2006, Hennicke and Fischedick 2006, McDowall and Eames
2006, Ricci et al. 2007a, 2007b). Major international bodies, energy agencies
and private corporations have committed signiﬁcant investment expenditure in
research and development of hydrogen energy systems (European Hydrogen
and Fuel Cell Technology Platform 2005, United Nations 2006). The major
advantages claimed are reduced greenhouse gas emissions and improved
security of supply. However, there are still signiﬁcant uncertainties about the
performance and reliability of fuel-cell technologies, about the overall
feasibility and eﬃciency of production, distribution and storage systems (e.g.
as a gas or liquid there are highly demanding requirements about pressure and
temperature). There are also questions about the public’s perceptions (and
acceptability) of hydrogen’s hazards, risks and beneﬁts. Technological
innovation is in its earliest stages, with, for example, prototype hydrogen
fuel-cell vehicles (cars and buses) now being introduced, and other applications
under development.
To investigate public perceptions of the emerging ‘hydrogen economy’ we
carried out focus groups with members of the general public. Three areas in the
UK – Teesside, south west Wales, and London – were selected for detailed
study, based on the knowledge that there were already commercial production
and storage facilities for hydrogen in situ and/or that in those areas, energy
agencies, private companies and local authorities had embarked upon the
introduction of hydrogen energy-based technologies. Given the fact that
hydrogen energy is still a relatively ‘unknown’ and emergent technology, it was
decided that large-scale survey methods were inadequate and inappropriate to
gauge the extent of public awareness of, and attitudes to hydrogen energy.
Instead, focus groups were used to explore people’s understandings of energy
and environmental issues and their attitudes towards new hydrogen
technologies. In total, nine groups were held during October–December
2005: four in Teesside, three in London and two in Wales. Further
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methodological details and results from this study have been published
elsewhere (Ricci et al. 2007a, 2007b).
Members of the public were recruited through local authorities’ public
consultation panels; in these areas, there were already-existing ‘citizens
panels’ drawn from a representative sample of the local population. The
focus groups for this study were mixed in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and
socio-economic group. They were speciﬁcally recruited on the basis that they
did not have scientiﬁc or technological background, or close familiarity with
energy technologies. Groups varied in size from six to (in one exceptional
case) 13 members. Meetings were facilitated by the authors, and lasted one-
and-a-half hours. Discussions were tape-recorded; subsequent to transcrip-
tion, thematic analysis was carried out independently by each team member,
and then through a process of validation by triangulation (Barbour and
Kitzinger 1999, Bloor et al. 2001). Focus group members were ﬁrst asked to
indicate whether they were aware of general issues about the environment,
energy, global warming and so on, and then were asked to consider diﬀerent
types of energy source; they were asked if they had heard of hydrogen
energy, and then shown visual materials and given brief simpliﬁed
explanations of hydrogen technologies. The discussion below is based on
qualitative data analysis of the discussions about ‘the environment’,
‘sustainability’ and issues which relate to hydrogen energy and environmental
citizenship. As is conventional in reporting focus group data analysis,
ﬁndings are summarised for groups as a whole, and then illustrative
quotations are provided.
There were some consistent and general ﬁndings from all of the focus
groups in each of the three areas. First, people had high levels of awareness
of problems associated with climate change and global warming; they were
aware of greenhouse gases and the eﬀects of pollution. Many participants
characterised these problems in terms of extremes in weather patterns, and
referred to perceived increases in air pollution from road transport. Second,
people were very aware of a crisis over the supply of fossil fuels, and were
especially knowledgeable about (and concerned by) recent increases in fuel
(gas, electricity, petrol/diesel) prices. Third, these concerns were frequently
linked with anxiety about and criticism of the international political
situation, and their recognition of dependency on foreign states for future
supplies. Fourth, in general, while most people could describe some of the
properties of hydrogen (e.g. a gas, abundant, potentially explosive, etc.)
knowledge about hydrogen as an energy carrier was limited. Fifth, public
perceptions of hydrogen were neither entirely positive nor completely
negative. People always framed their views about hydrogen and its possible
uses in terms of their own experiences and in relation to the local context –
for example, whether there was a history of employment in local industries
related to, or similar to, hydrogen production (coal mining, petrochemicals).
Sixth, people expressed opinions and asked questions about hydrogen within
a broad framework of concern about the natural environment and made
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explicit comparisons with other sources of energy. Seventh, it was evident
that they were willing and able to discuss energy issues in the context of
their personal beliefs and values. While concerns about potential hazards
and risks to safety were voiced, these did not appear to form the basis of
outright opposition or rejection of hydrogen technologies. The dominant
presumption was that hydrogen energy technologies will have been
thoroughly tested and systems ‘engineered’ before their widespread
introduction. In almost all the focus group meetings, participants indicated
that the decision to adopt these new technologies would be determined by
trade-oﬀs between cost or price, ‘usability’ and convenience, safety, and
environmental beneﬁts. Finally, a general ﬁnding was that participants
shared a distrust of government (and also to some extent, business and
industry) in relation to their willingness to genuinely accommodate citizen or
consumer views about energy.
More speciﬁcally, the following observations from diﬀerent groups in the
three areas illustrate their views about awareness of global warming,
responsibility for behaviour change and hydrogen energy technologies.
Awareness of global warming, environmental problems and an energy crisis
In Teesside, one group expressed very strong concerns about the fossil fuels
crisis, carbon emissions and environmental pollution. They indicated that while
these issues were not having an immediate impact on their own daily lives, they
were worried that their children’s and grandchildren’s lives would be negatively
aﬀected. For example:
In our lifetime maybe the changes are going to be relatively small. But when we
read about what could be happening in 40 years time, 30 to 40 years, it’s
horrifying to think about our grandchildren. (Teesside, Group 1, male)
In the second Teesside group, one man commented:
You are talking to people, do you think that the environment is getting in a worse
state? I think at my age I am realising that. I think it’s our younger generation
that are going to come through, the kids . . .
Another man interjected:
I know about it . . . My 10 year old probably thinks that everything’s absolutely
ﬁne and when she gets to 30 and she starts having a family, is she going
to think the same? Is she going to be alert to it, and is it going to be too late by
then?
There was group agreement that ‘something must be done’ about this,
especially at international level.
In both groups in Wales, high levels of concern about the environment were
expressed; each spontaneously mentioned the need to develop ‘alternative’ and
renewable energy sources. Central government was identiﬁed as the crucial
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agent to bring about large-scale change, but there was recognition that
individuals had to change their lifestyles – most people believed that cost
pressures would eventually force individuals to change their behaviour in
energy use.
In London, the group comprising young people (aged 16–25) was especially
concerned about global warming and the international dimensions of pollution
and energy crises. They advocated much stronger programmes of energy
conservation and recycling, and major changes in people’s attitudes to
transport. However, most agreed that energy issues were not equally salient
for everyone, and that people could not be forced to change their behaviour
unless price was the crucial factor. The two other groups in London identiﬁed
problems with global warming and the decline of fossil fuels. One group were
critical of ‘vested interests’ preventing radical innovations; the other group
agreed that people generally were aware of environmental problems but were
unwilling to change their own behaviour. In this London group, a male
participant said:
I think people are aware, but they are not, at the end of the day, being aware and
actually doing something about it. They are interested in diﬀerent things aren’t
they? But I think most people . . . say ‘I know about global warming, but I’m not
going to stop driving my car’.
Costs and taxation were seen as the most likely instruments to induce
change in energy use, and several members referred to the impact of the
London congestion charges and higher taxation on polluting vehicles. In the
third London group, one male participant argued that expecting the public to
alter their environmental behaviour when private corporations continued
unchecked was ineﬀective:
In terms of individuals, I’m not sure that changing everybody’s how they use
energy in this country is going to be much diﬀerent if the way business
and industries uses and disposes of energy and waste isn’t changed ﬁrst, because
that’s much greater. Industry is throwing out a lot more waste than ordinary
people are.
Much later in this group’s discussion, when considering the promotion of
hydrogen fuel-cell buses, a man commented about a potential disjunction
between people’s immediate health priorities and global environmental
concerns:
It’s no good saying you’re going to save the planet, they [the general public] don’t
give a toss about saving the planet – they care about saving their lungs, they care
about what’s happening to their kids. And it’s better to be selling things that
matter to people . . . saying that this bus is healthy, it isn’t polluting your kids,
asthma and all this.
Another participant immediately followed this up by indicating the need for
some collective or universal beneﬁts to be demonstrated: ‘What will ‘‘sell’’
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this is if we can ﬁnd ways and means for it to be available to all, and that will
‘‘sell’’ it’.
Responsibility for initiating behaviour change
In terms of locating responsibilities for taking action to improve energy use,
and the question of duties and obligations, opinion was divided across all the
focus groups in all the areas. For many participants, central and local
government were seen as needing to provide leadership and to take
responsibility for initiating energy conservation and encouraging the take-
up of new ‘green’ technologies, in order to achieve the necessary large-scale
and long-term changes required. At the same time, individuals were seen as
the ultimate source of action, but changes in behaviour were mainly seen as
resulting from self-interest, linked with direct threats caused by large
increases in fuel prices, for example, and/or ﬁnancial incentives to move to
new technologies. For a signiﬁcant minority in each of the focus groups,
there was scepticism about whether people would make changes voluntarily,
and doubts about whether people would be motivated by wider solidaristic
goals.
To illustrate this, from the second Teesside group, one man commented:
Well when I think about the environment I look at it from a personal and local
perspective rather than globally. Because no matter what we do here, somebody
else somewhere . . . might do something totally diﬀerent which negates what we’re
doing here. So I look to the fact that my living environment is clean. If it’s good
for me, then it’s up to everybody else to clean theirs.
A woman in the same group, discussing recycling schemes, said that ‘there is a
shocking amount of apathy where I live certainly, and they [other residents]
can’t be bothered’. She went on to say that residents should be penalised by
higher council taxes if they did not participate in recycling. Other focus group
members supported her view that in some neighbourhoods, people were not
joining in with the scheme, and they were critical of this apathy and non-
participation. Later in the discussion, a man observed:
If you ask me about responsibility, as a parent I’m responsible to my daughter
and children about all sorts. I think there is responsibility for each and every one
of us as well, individually . . . Erm, but I also think the responsibility’s for the next
generation to do something about it as well, and not just think it’s someone else’s
responsibility.
In a diﬀerent Teesside group, when discussing polices which might reduce
energy consumption and facilitate wider public involvement, one woman
stressed the need for greater commitment by people. Another then said ‘You
can’t bludgeon people into your way of thinking . . . Society is interdependent
surely, and whatever one person does there is ramiﬁcations for the next?’ Later,
having discussed variations in individuals’ and companies’ adherence to
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environmental health laws, and problems in encouraging the adoption of new
energy-saving technologies, a woman noted:
I still feel though that one of the important points has got to be about
wastefulness, because there is sort of an enlightenment that science can provide
for everything without personal responsibility for a change in our ways, and I
think that has got to be addressed too. So it’s ﬁne and dandy coming up with
new technology, but you’ve got to say ‘Well look at this, this is the cost, as
well as this is what you’ve got to do’. It’s alright having rights but you’ve
got to have responsibilities too, and I think that’s what we’ve got to be
careful of.
Another woman immediately followed this up by saying ‘I think rights and
responsibilities goes through life anyway. You know, that’s standard for me.’
Another woman then said: ‘There will always be people who care, and people
who really don’t care. And I don’t think you’ll ever get round to the ones who
don’t care.’
Similar views were expressed in each of the two focus groups in Wales, and
there were some instances where caution was expressed about the willingness of
people to modify their behaviour (to become more environmentally oriented).
After discussing general levels of awareness of issues such as global warming
and the energy crisis, and whether people were prepared to change their own
patterns of energy use, in Group 1, one woman commented:
Yes, and they say something should be done, but it’s always by somebody else.
They don’t think they can make any diﬀerence themselves. And as well, if
somebody says ‘Well, do recycling’, they say ‘Oh, I can’t be bothered with that’.
That sort of attitude as well, that’s what I get.
A few minutes later, a woman suggested that many people are reluctant to
acknowledge the seriousness of the wider environmental problems and ‘push it
aside’ and a man agreed with her, commenting:
They’re not going to worry about whether the ozone layer’s breaking down, or
climate change or whether the ice cap’s melted. You know they’re too wrapped up
in getting by from day to day, you know.
Later still, there were some more positive expectations that people could be
persuaded to engage in ‘green’ actions. One woman argued that energy policy
initiatives would succeed if they came from the ‘grassroots’, so that ‘people
realise that they as an individual can make a diﬀerence, and it’s getting over
that hump of what an individual can do’. As the debate continued, however,
this was countered as one man questioned the impact of local environmental
and energy-saving schemes, and argued instead for more job creation to
combat local unemployment:
I’d rather see 10 factories . . . keeping people in work . . . Now I’d rather have my
gas on or my energy, my lights on, than a few little doves running around . . . I’m
Environmental Politics 777
not being funny about it – sometimes you’ve got to take a step back and say
‘Listen, we haven’t got a choice here folks, this is what we’re going to do’.
The second focus group in Wales predominantly emphasised that it is
economic constraints and incentives that would most aﬀect people’s decision to
adopt new energy technologies and more ‘environmentally-friendly’ lifestyles –
rather than some generalised commitment to collective or global welfare. One
man claimed that:
We are doing too little too late, and if you want to make a diﬀerence then you
have got to do it by yourself. You have got to change yourself.
This was immediately followed by a woman who observed:
. . . but the trouble is the individual person, they don’t know – say they want to
save the environment, but how much is it going to cost?
Later in the meeting another man challenged the belief that most people were
suﬃciently concerned about the environment and energy. He said:
It’s very diﬃcult to know what proportion of the population really care about
these things . . . I don’t know what the public, what proportion of the public
really care.
A woman then immediately observed: ‘I think they [the public] don’t under-
stand the seriousness of it’. This provoked a debate about the inﬂuence of the
mass media, conﬂicting advice from scientists and experts, and the importance
of school-level education about these issues. Throughout the exchanges, most in
the group seemed to agree that cost factors will probably determine people’s
acceptance of new energy systems: wider environmental or ‘public good’
objectives were seen as less immediately relevant in everyday lives.
Attitudes to hydrogen energy technologies
After the general discussion, focus group participants were shown slides and
other visual material about hydrogen energy systems. These explained basic
features of hydrogen as an energy carrier, and also showed images of hydrogen
fuel-cell vehicles, production facilities and other demonstration projects and
prototypes, as well as methods of storage and distribution. Levels of awareness
were relatively low in each of the three areas even though the localities in which
the focus groups were held contained either large-scale production facilities, or
proposals for major development schemes using hydrogen, or demonstrator
hydrogen buses. In general, most participants adopted neutral views about the
desirability of a shift toward hydrogen energy systems. While some concerns
about safety were expressed, these were not overwhelmingly strong.
Most people wanted to be given much more detailed information about the
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likely beneﬁts, costs and risks of such technologies. Many also asked searching
questions about the relative eﬃciency and costs of hydrogen compared with
other energy sources and carriers.
On questions of production, one man in Teesside asked:
How eﬃcient is electrolysis . . . how much carbon do you actually need to produce
hydrogen from water?
Another in a diﬀerent Teesside group asked:
There are lots of uses for hydrogen once you’ve got it, but where do you get it
from, how do you produce it and how much does it cost to produce it?
Similarly, a woman in Wales asked: ‘How does it compare with other fuels?’
In the other Wales group, a woman asked: ‘Is it [transportation] the most
eﬀective use of hydrogen in terms of fuel?’
In all the focus groups people questioned whether a shift to hydrogen
would really help solve energy and environmental problems. Many asked
numerous questions about the practical applications and use of hydrogen
technologies. It was evident from the discussion that before indicating whether
they were prepared to approve or support hydrogen, people expected much
more information about what one referred to as ‘the bigger picture’. Support
was highly conditional and dependent upon their perception of the seriousness
of the energy crisis, and also immediate local circumstances such as
unemployment, regeneration or air pollution.
People’s views about possible future hydrogen applications such as in
vehicles, combined-heat-and-power systems or portable devices were ﬁrmly
placed in a context of ‘trade-oﬀs’ between personal cost, convenience and
safety. Environmental and global beneﬁts appeared to be low in their list of
priorities. Instead the direct impact on their own household expenditure
appeared their major concern.
For example, as one man on Teesside commented:
people on the street . . . they are interested in what the bill is at the end of the
month or quarter or whatever it is.
In Wales, one man suggested that:
I don’t think people would want to know the detail [of how hydrogen
technologies work] but if they could be reassured and believe it was economical
[then they would accept them].
In London, a man observed:
People vote with their wallets you know. If hydrogen is going to be a lot cheaper
than petrol then they are going to use hydrogen.
Environmental Politics 779
A woman in the same London group, discussing whether hydrogen systems
would be acceptable, commented:
if it’s not going to disrupt their lifestyle too much, if it’s not going to be too costly
for them. Because it sounds like in the end the general public would say ‘How
much is that going to cost me?’
Overall, there was a consistent emphasis that to gain acceptance and
support, hydrogen technologies would ﬁrst have to show demonstrable beneﬁts
to consumers in terms of cost and practicality. Potential environmental beneﬁts
for the wider community were only of secondary concern.
Conclusions
There were some variations within and between the focus groups in their
reported beliefs about and attitudes towards environmental and sustainability
issues. But there are also some dominant themes which recurred in each area.
First, there was a recognition that global warming, climate change and energy
use were serious problems which confronted individuals and nation-states.
Second, however, there was a kind of dissonance between people’s acknowl-
edgement of the problems and challenges, and their willingness or capacity to
adjust their behaviour. This was expressed in several ways. One concerns the
tension between individual self-interest and collective or solidaristic beneﬁts.
Some people indicated that they might try to alter their consumption or
approve stricter environmental controls if it was beneﬁcial to their own and
their children’s health, but their concern for ‘global’ matters, or even other
regions of the country, was more limited or even absent. Similarly, many
suggested that they might adopt more environment-friendly practices, but
could not (or would not) rely on other people to do the same, so this was a
deterrent – the classic problem of collective action. Another aspect of people’s
reluctance to radically change their behaviour concerned their cynicism – or
perhaps, more accurately, fatalism – about business and governmental
interests. It was frequently noted that innovation and change needed
leadership from government, but this was counterbalanced by some opposition
to ‘vested interests’ and support for more ‘grassroots’ action. Finally,
another dominant theme emerged from each of the focus groups: economic
factors were highly signiﬁcant in people’s approach to environmental and
energy issues. Thus, people’s interest in, and willingness to adopt, new energy
systems and technologies were heavily inﬂuenced by considerations of cost or
price. Many were also cautious about the potential trade-oﬀs between
economic growth and employment, and more rigorous environmental and
energy controls.
These ﬁndings indicate that despite the apparent ‘green’ promise
represented by advocates of hydrogen energy, public attitudes towards it are
neutral or non-committal. But they are also not shaped by altruistic concern for
the wider public good. These attitudes are in line with many previous studies
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about environmental beliefs and behaviour, and in many ways are consistent
with the views reported 10 years ago by Macnaghten and Urry (1998). Clearly
environmental risks and energy issues have become more problematic at
national and international levels, and people’s general awareness of them is
substantial and growing. There is a consciousness of the importance of energy
resources and potential ecological crises, and some acknowledgement that
these have an immediate impact upon lifestyles and general sustainability.
People generally are conscious that their patterns of consumption, lifestyles
and living standards are constrained by structures and processes which they
usually regard as beyond their immediate control. The qualitative case-study
evidence described here indicates that, while there may be a conditional or
provisional recognition of environmental rights and responsibilities, this
cannot be characterised as a fully-ﬂedged ‘environmental citizenship’.
Sustainability may have been identiﬁed as a worthwhile goal, and as having
resonance with the notion of a ‘common good’, but there were few signs in
focus group discussion that people’s collective welfare was the primary
objective. Instead, attitudes seemed to converge on instrumental and privatised
outlooks, with an improved environment or greater energy eﬃciency being seen
as desirable for individuals and households. Environmental and energy threats
were acknowledged, but they tended to be seen as ‘distal’ concerns, remote
from immediate practical action. The responsibilities inherent in ecological
citizenship were salient for only some participants, but their practice was
contingent on many other factors.
Dobson (2003) and Dobson and Bell (2006) argue that ecological or
environmental citizenship requires acceptance and endorsement of collective
values and solidaristic objectives, but in this case of attitudes towards energy
and new energy systems, there is little evidence of a shared (perceived)
community of interests. In considering energy and the environment, people’s
material well-being is dependent on access to scarce (and depleting) energy
sources, and energy itself is commodiﬁed, but this common interest is only
constituted at an abstract and ‘macro’ level. It is the expediency of everyday
life, and the immediacy of localised conditions, that appear to shape people’s
beliefs and action about energy, whether based on conventional fossil fuels or
on the hydrogen economy. In this ﬁeld at least, environmental citizenship
remains latent and ecological citizenship has yet to evolve.
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